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SYMPOSIUM REVIEW
A POLICY AND ECONOMIC EXPLORATION OF
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Abstract
Critics assert that certain practices by wireless service
providers-such as handset locking, data bandwidth limitations, and
control over features included on handsets-unduly hamper the ability
of consumers to access advanced data communications services.
Whether these wireless service providers should be required to open
their networks to users' choices of wireless handsets has been the
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focus of recent policy debates in the United States surrounding
potential regulatory intervention. This intervention, often called
"wireless Carterfone" rules (after an FCC 1968 decision for the
landline telephone network), would ban some of these practices and
mandate that service providers design their networks to accommodate
the user's choice of wireless handsets and equipment. This article
explores the historical background of the Carterfone decision and its
application to the contemporary wireless industry in light of two
significant economic implications. First, the regulations that
commoditize the wireless network services industry may harm the
prospects for entry and competition in that industry. Therefore, while
the concentrated nature of the wireless market is often cited as a
reason for imposing wireless Carterfone rules, those rules may in fact
exacerbate that market concentration. Second, wireless Carterfone
rules may have the effect of increasing prices for handsets without
any offsetting price decrease for wireless network services. As a
result, consumer welfare may decrease without any guarantee that
producer or social welfare will increase.
WIRELESS CARTERFONE REGULATION
I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Critics assert that certain practices by wireless service providers-
such as handset locking, data bandwidth limitations, and control over
features included on handsets-unduly hamper the ability of
consumers to access advanced data communications services.
Whether these wireless service providers should be required to open
their networks to users' choices of wireless handset has been the
focus of recent policy debates in the United States surrounding
potential regulatory intervention. This intervention, often called
"wireless Carterfone" rules (after an FCC 1968 decision for the
landline telephone network), would ban some of these practices and
mandate that service providers design their networks to accommodate
the user's choice of wireless handset.
Carterfone and the subsequent line of decisions began with the
Federal Communications Commission's (FCC) 1968 Carterfone
decision, in which the agency required the Bell System to allow
telephone devices from unaffiliated manufacturers to be connected to
the local phone network.2 The Bell System's incentives to sabotage
the evolution of a competitive equipment market are well understood
as being a consequence of the presence of market power, vertical
integration, and regulation. The FCC's decision, 3  along with
subsequent related decisions and rules, created the competitive
telephone equipment market we observe today. This basic principle
has been applied in other contexts, including cable set-top boxes, in
which both a statute and various FCC rules require that the cable
industry design their networks in a way that accommodates the
1. See, e.g., Communications, Broadband and Competitiveness: How Does the U.S.
Measure Up?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Commerce, Sci. and Transportation, I 10th
Cong. (2007) [hereinafter Scott Testimony] (statement of Ben Scott, Policy Director, Free
Press), available at http://www.freepress.netlfiles/42407bssentestimony.pdf; Skype Commc'ns
S.A.R.L., Petition to Confirm a Consumer's Right to Use Internet Communications Software
and Attach Devices to Wireless Networks, No. RM-l 1361 (Feb. 20, 2007) [hereinafter Skype
Petition), available at
http://svartifoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf-pdf&iddocument-6518909730;
Tim Wu, Wireless Network Neutrality: Cellular Carterfone on Mobile Networks, I INT'L J.
COMM. 389, 393-94 (2007), http:/lijoc.org/ojs/index.php/ijoc/article/viewFile/152/96.
2. See Scott Testimony, supra note 1, at 19 ("Carterphone [sic] rules should apply to the
wireless broadband platform."); Skype Petition, supra note 1, at 25-30 (calling on the FCC to
"declare that wireless carrier services are fully subject to Carterfone" and to "enforce the
mandate of Carterfone in the wireless industry"); Wu, supra note 1, at 391, 395.
3. See Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 423
(1968); see also Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 20 F.C.C. 391, 419 (1955), revd
per curiam, 238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
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independent manufacture and provision of set-top boxes. 4 Wireless
Carterfone proponents generally appeal to this line of court decisions
which de-linked and eventually banned the monopoly provider of
telephone service (the Bell System) from bundling the sale of
telephone equipment with telephone service.
Section II demonstrates that telephone services and cable set-top
boxes do not support the imposition of Carterfone rules on the
wireless industry. Regulators in Carterfone responded to behavior
motivated by the presence of market power, vertical integration, and
regulation, all of which, when combined, provide a potent recipe for
creating an incentive to sabotage the adjacent equipment market.
However, none of these conditions are present in today's wireless
industry. In fact, as competition has emerged, even in landline
telephony, the FCC has loosened its Carterfone-type rules
consistently. Even with regard to cable set-top boxes, in which
interoperability is a statutory mandate, the FCC has refused to apply
these mandates to the satellite television industry, due to the presence
of competition and the widespread availability of equipment in retail
outlets. These same factors unquestionably apply to the wireless
telephone industry today.
Section III explores two significant economic implications of
potential wireless Carterfone regulation. First, wireless Carterfone
regulation would commoditize the wireless network services industry
and may harm the prospects for entry and competition in that
industry. Product and service differentiation are critical to how
wireless carriers compete to obtain and retain subscribers. Therefore,
the FCC has generally eschewed policies that would commoditize
wireless services and have instead given wireless licensees flexibility
to develop and deploy services with much less government command-
and-control than other nations. Therefore, while the concentrated
nature of the wireless market is often cited as a reason for imposing
wireless Carterfone rules, those rules may, in fact, exacerbate that
market concentration. Second, wireless Carterfone rules may have the
4. See 47 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2000); Implementation of Section 304 of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996: Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices, Report &
Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 14775, 14776 (1998) [hereinafter Navigation Devices Order]. The FCC
extended the implementation deadline of these requirements in 2003 via the Implementation of
Section 304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Commercial Availability of Navigation
Devices, 18 F.C.C.R. 7924, 7924 (2003), and again in 2005 via the Implementation of Section
304 of the Telecommunications Act of 1996: Commercial Availability of Navigation Devices,
Second Report & Order, 20 F.C.C.R. 6794, 6794 (2005). See also Skype Petition, supra note 1,
at 11 (noting that while "[t]he context was different" for the cable navigation device rules, "the
principle was pure Carterfone").
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effect of increasing prices for handsets without any offsetting price
decrease for wireless network services. As a result, consumer welfare
may decrease without any guarantee that producer or social welfare
will increase.
II. THE HISTORICAL PRECEDENT OF CARTERFONE AND TODAY'S
WIRELESS INDUSTRY
The FCC devised its Carterfone rules in order to prevent the
dominant, regulated, and vertically-integrated telephone service
provider from leveraging that market power into the telephone
equipment market. This leveraging or sabotage of adjacent markets is
a common concern with regard to many categories of vertical
exclusionary conduct. In deciding whether regulatory intervention to
prevent that conduct is appropriate for today's wireless industry, an
obvious question is whether the conditions that lead to the threat of
sabotage that were present in Carterfone are present in the wireless
industry today.
This section explores the historical background of the Carterfone
decision, as well as its progeny, the cable set-top box interoperability
rules, and finds that it was the combination of market power and
regulation that made the threat of sabotage by the dominant landline
provider into the adjacent equipment market a legitimate concern.
Indeed, as explained below, it was the presence of regulation and the
lack of competition over the landline and cable networks-not their
absence-that made Carterfone regulation necessary. However, similar
conditions are not present in today's wireless industry.
A. The Carterfone Decision
The FCC's 1968 Carterfone decision was an important
regulatory watershed in communications history. To a large extent,
the ability today to purchase telephones from a variety of
manufacturers at a number of retailers is a direct result of that
decision. However, its full influence was not felt until it was
commingled with subsequent decisions and rulemaking proceedings.
The FCC's decision effectively allowed manufacturers unaffiliated
with the Bell System to manufacture telephones, under strict technical
standards, that consumers could purchase and connect to the
telephone network without restriction or additional fees levied by the
phone company. At that time, the Bell System's affiliate, Western
Electric, was the exclusive (and only) manufacturer of telephones for
the Bell System, and the FCC's decision to mandate a standard
2009]
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technical interface to the telephone network allowed for the
emergence of competition in the manufacture and sale of telephone
equipment.
When considering the implications of Carterfone for the wireless
industry, it is important to understand the environment, including the
presence of regulation, in which the original decision was made. At
the time of Carterfone, the Bell System had a virtual monopoly over
the entire telephone network, stretching from telephone to telephone
and everything in between. The firm was regulated at all levels, a
consequence of its bargain with the government in the Kingsbury
Commitment of 1913, where the government countenanced its
monopoly in return for its regulatory durance.5 In most cases, the only
source of telephone equipment was Western Electric, a wholly-owned
subsidiary of the Bell System.6
While it has become fashionable to refer to customer premises
equipment attachment rules as "Carterfone rules," these principles in
fact extend back much further. Indeed, the FCC's 1968 Carterfone
decision was the result of a decade of case-by-case litigation over the
extent to which the Bell System could control the attachment of
"foreign" devices onto this vertically-integrated system.7 The FCC
confronted disputes over precursors to the telephone answering
machine (one called the Jordaphone) and frequently sided with the
Bell System.8 In one notable passage, the FCC stated generally that
"telephone equipment should be supplied by and under control of the
carrier itself."9 The D.C. Circuit reversed this decision in 1956 and
5. STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW AND POLICY 623-28
(2001); SUSAN E. MCMASTER, THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS INDUSTRY 45-46 (2002).
6. Roger B. Noll & Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United
States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST REVOLUTION: THE ROLE OF ECONOMICS 328, 340 (John E.
Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 2d ed. 1994) ("In all but a few cases, the Bell Operating
Companies purchased essentially all of their equipment from Western Electric, the Bell
System's manufacturing arm."). While the Bell System is often criticized for its lack of
innovation in telephone equipment, this lack of innovation may have been due, at least in part, to
the fact that this equipment was effectively subject to price regulation. For the role of regulation
in communications markets on quality, see THOMAS W. HAZLETT & MATTHEW L. SPITZER,
PUBLIC POLICY TOWARD CABLE TELEVISION: THE ECONOMICS OF RATE CONTROLS 95-98
(1997) and Donald J. Boudreaux & Robert B. Ekelund, Jr., The Cable Television Consumer
Protection and Competition Act of 1992: The Triumph of Private over Public Interest, 44 ALA.
L. REV. 355, 357-59 (1993).
7. See PETER W. HUBER ET AL., FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS LAW § 8.4.1.1-2 (2d
ed. 1999).
8. Id § 8.4.1.1 & n.59.
9. Hush-A-Phone Corp., 20 F.C.C. at 419. The Hush-A-Phone case involved a dispute
over a simple metal device that fit over the telephone mouthpiece that cupped around the
speaker's mouth, allowing the speaker some privacy in a telephone conversation.
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found that a telephone consumer had a "right [to reasonably] use his
telephone in ways which are privately beneficial without being
publicly detrimental."'
' 0
Armed with this legal standard, the Carterfone dispute centered
around a rudimentary mobile telephony device-a radio upon which a
telephone handset might be placed, so that the user may communicate
through the telephone via a wireless connection." The FCC overruled
the Bell System's objections to the device, finding that such
equipment could be connected to the network "so long as the
interconnection does not adversely affect the telephone company's
operations or the telephone system's utility for others.' 12 That
decision touched off another decade of controversy and litigation that
eventually led to the development of the rules now generally referred
to as the "Carterfone rules," which were eventually codified in 47
C.F.R. § 64.702.
It is important to understand, however, that the Bell System's
motivations in excluding rival equipment stemmed from its position
as a regulated monopoly. This general posture carried through to the
landmark antitrust action that broke up the Bell System-as noted by
Noll and Own, "[tihe essence of the government's case against the
Bell System was that it had used its status as a regulated monopoly in
most of its markets to erect anticompetitive barriers to entry in
potentially competitive markets."' 13 Indeed, at the time of Carterfone,
the nation had a phone company with the following traits: (1) it was a
monopoly; (2) it was vertically integrated into nearly all stages of its
industry; and (3) it was regulated at nearly every level of its
business. 14 As discussed more fully below, that context provided
opportunities and incentives for the Bell System to manipulate
adjacent and unregulated markets, and to attempt to extend its
dominant, monopoly position into those markets to extract the
monopoly rent that regulation in its primary market prevented it from
collecting.
This context is very different than that found in the mobile
telecommunications industry today. In today's wireless industry, the
carriers are obviously not monopolists, and the FCC acknowledges
10. Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 238 F.2d 266, 269 (D.C. Cir. 1956) (per
curiam).
11. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C. 2d 420, 420-21
(1968).
12. Id. at424.
13. Noll & Owen, supra note 6, at 333.
14. Id. at 330-33.
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that they compete aggressively on service quality, features, and
prices. 5 Over ninety-five percent of the country lives in areas with
three or more mobile carriers offering service.' 6 The FCC, therefore,
has repeatedly concluded that "there is effective competition in the
[wireless] market," and this position is unchanged even after the
recent mergers of several large wireless carriers. 17
Second, the wireless industry is not vertically integrated into the
manufacture of telephone equipment. Thus, the potential for the
sabotage of competing equipment manufacturers to protect an
equipment affiliate is entirely absent in the wireless industry. Since
the Carterfone decision was essentially about actions aimed to protect
the position of an affiliated equipment manufacturer, how exactly the
decision applies to the wireless industry is a bit of a mystery.
Finally, and most importantly, the wireless industry is not
subject to price regulation. 18 The presence of regulation is critical to
the Carterfone decision, since without regulation, a firm would have
little incentive to sabotage and the decision likely would have been
unnecessary in the first instance. As noted by Beard, Kaserman, and
Mayo, the factors necessary for sabotage-defined as the ability to
increase or raise the cost of a rival's key input of production by non-
price behavior (e.g., blocking)-include, but are not limited to, the
following: (a) "[s]ignificant monopoly power in one or more markets"
and (b) the "[p]resence of price or profit regulation."' 9 This approach
15. Even Professor Wu admits that wireless services are available at "competitive prices
to the public." Wu, supra note 1, at 389.
16. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993: Annual Report and Analysis of Competitive Market Conditions with Respect to
Commercial Mobile Services, 23 F.C.C.R. 2241, 2245 (2008) [hereinafter CMRS Competition
Report].
17. Id; Applications of Nextel Communications, Inc., and Sprint Corp. for Consent to
Transfer Control of Licenses and Authorizations, 20 F.C.C.R 13967, 14055 (2005) (statement of
Michael J. Copps, Comm'r, FCC) ("But in most of [U.S. wireless] markets four or more
substantial competitors will continue to compete post-merger.").
18. See 47 U.S.C. § 332(c) (2000); see also Petition of the Connecticut Department
Public Utility Control to Retain Regulatory Control of the Rates of Wholesale Cellular Service
Providers in the State of Connecticut, Report & Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 7025, 7026 (1995), aff'd sub
nor. Conn. Dept. of Pub. Util. Control v. FCC, 78 F.3d 842 (2d Cir. 1996).
19. T. Randolph Beard, David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Monopoly Leveraging,
Path Dependency, and the Case for a Local Competition Threshold for RBOC Entry into
InterLATA Toll, in REGULATION UNDER INCREASING COMPETITION 37 (Michael A. Crew ed.,
1999); see also Olympia Equip. Leasing Co. v. W. Union Tel. Co., 797 F.2d 370, 374 (7th Cir.
1986) ("There are, however, special circumstances in which a rational monopolist may want to
restrict competition in an input market; as it happens, one of those circumstances is where the
monopolist's rates are regulated."). Likewise, we have demonstrated the role of regulation in
sabotage in earlier work. See, e.g., T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford & Lawrence J. Spiwak,
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is consistent with more general and well-accepted economic
treatments of leveraging.20 As summarized by Ordover, Sykes, and
Willig:
In sum, when a regulated firm is subject to a binding rate-of-return
ceiling that exceeds its true marginal cost of capital, it has a profit
incentive to expand in to the production of vertically related
services.... If, however, the regulated firm is comparatively
inefficient in producing vertically related services, it may still
endeavor to extend its monopoly by means of such tactics as
below-cost pricing, tie-ins, andPredatory systems rivalry-all to the
detriment of economic welfare.
The explicit and primary role that regulation played in the Carterfone
decision is well established. As noted in a paper by Farrell and
Weiser, the Bell System's entry deterring behavior in telephone
equipment was "because of the price regulation of local telephone
service. ,22 Economists recognize that it was the combination of
market power at the downstream level and classic public utility-type
Why ADCo? Why Now? An Economic Exploration into the Future of Industry Structure for the
"Last Mile" in Local Telecommunications Markets, 54 FED. COM. L. J. 421,448 (2002).
20. See generally T. Randolph Beard, David L. Kaserman & John W. Mayo, Regulation,
Vertical Integration and Sabotage, 49 J. INDUS. ECON. 319 (2001); Joseph Farrell, Integration
and Independent Innovation on a Network, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 420 (2003); Joseph Farrell &
Philip J. Weiser, Modularity, Vertical Integration, and Open Access Policies: Towards a
Convergence ofAntitrust and Regulation in the Internet Age, 17 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 85 (2003);
David M. Mandy & David E.M. Sappington, Incentives for Sabotage in Vertically Related
Industries, 31 J. REG. ECON. 235 (2007); David E.M. Sappington & Dennis L. Weisman, Self-
Sabotage, 27 J. REG. ECON. 155 (2005); Michael. D. Whinston, Tying, Foreclosure, and
Exclusion, 80 AM. ECON. REV. 837 (1990).
21. JA. Ordover, A.D. Sykes & R.D. Willig, Nonprice Anticompetitive Practices by
Dominant Firms Toward the Producers of Complementary Products, in ANTITRUST AND
REGULATION: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF JOHN J. MCGOWAN 127 (Franklin M. Fisher ed., 1985).
22. Farrell & Weiser, supra note 20, at 106-07.
This exception to [the economics theorem that firms vertically integrate to
"internalize complementary efficiencies" or "ICE"] has figured prominently in
telecommunications policy. In particular, the Bell System allegedly leveraged its
way to market power in complementary markets, denying equal access to its
network to competitors in long distance and equipment manufacturing. By
excluding such competitors, AT&T could rent telephones to its customers and
sell equipment from its Western Electric affiliate to its operating companies or
telephone subscribers at inflated rates. Such a strategy was available to AT&T
because of its network-level market power, but ICE would claim the option
should be unattractive because it would decrease demand for telephone
subscription. But that decrease did not deter AT&T because of the price
regulation of local telephone service."
As a result, a regulated monopoly will have an inexorable incentive to seek to
collect that monopoly rent from adjacent markets.
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regulation that created the inventive for the Bell System to leverage
and exclude entry in the equipment sector (neither factor being
present in today's wireless industry). Accordingly, it was the firm's
efforts to evade regulation, not simply a monopolist's inherent desire
to protect revenue and profits, which created the incentive to sabotage
and necessitated the Carterfone decision.
B. Regulation as Cause for Intervention
The motivation to sabotage rivals or leverage market power is
often misunderstood. Indeed, policy debates over the proper scope of
intervention into these types of vertical relationships either grossly
understate or overstate the need for that intervention. As summarized
in Farrell and Weiser (2007), there is a set of particular instances in
which a firm has the incentive to leverage market power. 23 The
economic literature in this area is very large; however, the application
of these theories is highly fact-based and specific to the particular
industry in question. As a result, any general treatment is likely to
over (or under) state the case for and against intervention.
That being said, there is no denying that the presence of
regulation-particularly price regulation-can create an incentive for a
monopolist to sabotage an adjacent market. While regulation can take
many forms, a numerical example illustrates the effects of regulation
on anti-competitive behavior, including sabotage or vertical
leveraging, by assuming a simple form of price regulation.
Say there is a monopolist selling two goods, A and B. The two
goods must be consumed together to make a useful product for
consumers; that is, we assume the two goods are complements and
consumed in fixed proportions. Let the marginal cost for each good be
$1. In the initial state, say the unregulated monopolist charges $2 per
good so that the total package (AB) costs $4. The firm's profit is $2,
or $1 for each of the two goods.
Now, consider the scenario where entry occurs into the Good B
market. This entry results in marginal cost pricing so that the price of
Good B is $1. Ceteris paribus, the monopolist loses the $1 profit from
Good B and its aggregate profits fall to $1 as consumer price falls to
$3. But the ceteris paribus assumption is invalid. The monopolist, as
long as it is unregulated, can adjust to entry by increasing the price of
Good A to $3. As before entry, the total price is $4 and the
monopolist makes $2 profit, except now all the profit is from Good A.
23. See id. at 97-105.
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In such a case, the monopolist has no incentive to impede entry, since
it can adjust price for Good A to maintain its profit level.
In some cases, the monopolist may even prefer entry into the B
market. Say, for example, that the entrants are more efficient than the
incumbent, reducing marginal cost to $0.50. The price for Good B is
$0.50. Since the two goods are complements, the reduction in the
price of Good B increases the demand for Good A. This higher
demand translates into higher profits for the monopolist, even if the
consumer receives a lower overall price. Compensated with higher
profits, the monopolist welcomes competition for the B good.
In each of these cases, the monopolist did not impede entry
because it was free to adjust its prices to maintain or increase its
profits. If the monopolist cannot change price, then its behavior
changes. Take the case where the entrants are equally efficient. If the
price for Good A is regulated at $2, then the monopolist's profits are
reduced to $1 with competition over Good B. Consequently, the
monopolist is willing to spend up to $1 in profit per unit to impede or
sabotage entry. Even if entrants are more efficient, the monopolist
may frustrate entry, since overall profits may be lower if the price for
Good A is regulated below the profit maximizing level.
There are other cases where the monopolist may sabotage entry
efforts even without regulation, such as the threat of competition in
complementary markets. For example, if entry in the Good B market
eases entry in the Good A market, then the monopolist may frustrate
entrants. As shown above, the accommodation of entry requires the
ability to fully adjust the price of Good A to protect profit, and the
potential for competition in the monopoly market threatens the ability
to adjust prices.
As noted by Farrell and Weiser, there are other cases where the
monopolist would act in an exclusionary way, even with fixed
proportions. 24 The easiest way to think about exclusionary behavior is
to recognize the monopolist's preferred instrument in dealing with
entry is always a price change, not exclusion. Exclusion and sabotage
are costly alternatives to a price change. So, the relevant question for
exclusion is this: "Why can't the monopolist adjust price to solve the
entry problem in a complementary market?" Since price is preferred,
observing alternative solutions to entry is evidence that the price
mechanism is unavailable. This simplification also suggests that
24. See generally id.
2009] 657
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efforts to impede price adjustments in response to entry are likely to
result in sabotage, a fact frequently ignored in the debate.
C. Recent Applications of Carterfone to Telephone and Cable
Networks
Rather than expand the scope of Carterfone regulation, as
recently proposed by network neutrality advocates, the FCC has
continually reduced the applicability of the decision in the
communications industry, based primarily on the argument that such
intervention is not required in competitive industries. Since market
power is a relevant condition for sabotage, the agency's decisions
have an analytically-sound foundation.
As discussed above, Carterfone and subsequent decisions
eventually became part of a series of decisions, including the
Computer Inquiries, that evolved into various FCC rules, including
the "no bundling" rules.25 In 1992, the Commission stopped applying
this rule to the cellular industry. In regulatory parlance, the "incentive
to cross-subsidize" is shorthand for the economic theory of sabotage
discussed above, and the FCC found that motive to be reduced in the
wireless industry given "the lack of regulation based on rate-of-return
principles, combined with the absence of monopoly status for cellular
carriers. 2 6 The FCC later observed that this decision helped
consumers, giving them "the option of avoiding high up-front
expenditures by bundling service and equipment [which] was one of
the factors that contributed to the significant growth in the cellular
market.,
27
The FCC has also removed application of the "no bundling" rule
in the interstate, inter-exchange market and for non-dominant local
telephone companies. 28 An examination of whether the carrier had
market power was central to the FCC's analysis. As the FCC
observed, "[iut is a well established economic principle, however, that
in order for a buyer to be harmed by such an arrangement, the seller
must have market power over the desired product such that the buyer
25. 47 C.F.R. § 64.702 (2008).
26. Bundling of Cellular Customer Premises Equipment and Cellular Service, Report &
Order, 7 F.C.C.R. 4028, 4031 (1992). This decision was made when consumers only had a
choice of two cellular phone operators, before the licensing and entry of PCS carriers into the
wireless market.
27. Policy and Rules Concerning the Interstate, Interexchange Marketplace, Report &
Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 7418, 7438-39 (2001).
28. Id. at 7439-40.
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has no choice but to purchase it from the seller."29 The economic
rationale for the "no bundling" rules are similar to the proposed
Carterfone regime for the wireless industry. By that logic, since the
FCC has determined that the wireless industry is competitive and that
buyers do have choices among numerous equipment vendors, such
regulatory intervention would be unwarranted.
Proponents of wireless network neutrality regulation also cite
Congressional and FCC rules regarding cable set-top boxes (called
"navigation devices") as another template for regulatory
intervention. 30 Again, the distinctions between conditions giving rise
to these rules and the wireless marketplace are readily apparent,
rendering the Commission's policy and rules regarding cable set-top
"navigation devices" another useless precedent for regulating the
wireless industry.
The FCC's role in set-top box interoperability was mandated by
Congress, which sought to promote competition and availability of
these devices. 3' At the time this legislation was enacted, there was
very little, if any, retail availability of cable set-top boxes. Section
629 of the Communications Act mandates that television "navigation
devices" be interoperable so that consumers would have the ability to
purchase those devices from independent sources (i.e., not their video
services provider).32 Section 629 of the Act states:
The Commission shall, in consultation with appropriate industry
standard-setting organizations, adopt regulations to assure the
commercial availability, to consumers of multichannel video
programming and other services offered over multichannel video
programming systems, of converter boxes, interactive
communications equipment, and other equipment used by
consumers to access multichannel video programming and other
services offered over multichannel video programming systems,
from manufacturers, retailers, and other vendors not affiliated with
any multichannel video programming distributor.
33
In response to this Congressional mandate, the FCC's Navigation
Devices Order requires the cable television industry to develop and
support a CableCARD technology, where the tuning, descrambling,
29. Id. at 7431.
30. Skype Petition, supra note 1, at 11.
31. See Navigation Devices Order, supra note 4, at 14776 (noting that the rationale for
the rule was to "ensure the movement of navigation devices toward a fuilly competitive
market").
32. Id.
33. 47 U.S.C. § 549(a) (2000).
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and security features are effectively severed from the cable set-top
box.34 This CableCARD technology allows electronic manufacturers
to build television sets that are fully compatible with the cable system
without the need for a cable converter box, though the CableCARD
must be acquired and programmed by the cable operator.35
There are a number of facets to this application of Carterfone-
like principles that are important and interesting with regard to their
extension to wireless services. Like Carterfone, the cable set-top box
rules are aimed at promoting competition in the equipment markets by
giving consumers the right to purchase television set-top box
equipment from manufacturers, retailers, and other vendors not
affiliated with their video programming provider (usually the
dominant incumbent cable company).3 6 At the time of the decision, all
converter and security technology was only available from the
dominant cable operator,37 so the lack of equipment from retail outlets
and from different manufacturers was apparent and unquestioned.
This exclusive source of equipment links the set-top box case to
Carterfone.
In the wireless industry, by stark contrast, equipment is
manufactured by numerous manufacturers and can be purchased not
only in the carriers' stores, but at a large number of independent
retailers including electronics stores such as Best Buy, shopping mall
vendors, wireless resellers, eBay, and even Wal-Mart, as Table 1
demonstrates. In the table, the brands of landline telephones and
wireless carrier handsets available for purchase on the websites of two
34. Navigation Devices Order, supra note 4, at 14778.
35. Matthew Torres, About.com, Introduction to CableCARD Technology,
http://tv.about.com/od/cableandsatellitetv/a/CableCARDintro.htm (last visited Mar. 4, 2009).
36. The FCC recognized the common goal of the two decisions, but noted:
The parallel to the telephone has limitations. When customer ownership of
telephone CPE [customer premises equipment] became available, the telephone
network was effectively a national monopoly. Bell developed technical standards
existed throughout an almost ubiquitous network. CPE compatible with the
telephone network was part of this environment. In contrast, cable networks do
not reflect universal attributes, and have substantially different designs. Nor do
satellite systems share commonality beyond the most basic elements.
Additionally, as Section 629 recognizes, preventing interference to other network
users and maintaining the integrity of the system signal is of greater concern for
video delivery systems than for telephone systems.
Navigation Devices Order, supra note 4, at 14780.
37. Navigation Devices Order, supra note 4, 8 ("The focus of Section 629, however, is
on cable television set-top boxes, devices that have historically been available only on a lease
basis from the service provider.").
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large retail stores are listed.38 For both cases, the number of brands for
wireless equipment exceeds that of wireline devices. In effect, the
primary purpose of the Carterfone rules and set-top box legislation-
the widespread availability of devices for end-users-has already been
achieved in wireless communications.
More importantly, the set-top box rules explicitly recognize that
there is no need for this type of regulatory intervention when
competition develops. In particular, Section 629(e) sunsets these rules
when the FCC determines that the market for the multichannel video
programming distributors is fully competitive; that the market for
converter boxes, and interactive communications equipment used in
conjunction with that service is fully competitive; and that elimination
of the regulations would promote competition and the public
interest.
39
The FCC has applied this flexibility to waive the requirements of
the law for competitive providers of video programming. Most
notably, the FCC has affirmatively decided not to impose these rules
on satellite video providers, like DirecTV and Echostar, reasoning
that the availability of comparable devices was competitive:
[D]ifferences in the marketplace for DBS equipment, where
devices are available at retail and offer consumers a choice, as
compared to equipment for other MVPD services, particularly
cable operators, provide justification for not applying the rule
requiring separation of security functions to DBS service. We are
reluctant to implement a rule that could disrupt an evolving market
that is already offering consumers the benefits that derive from
competition. In the DBS environment, there are three service
providers and at least ten equipment manufacturers competing to
provide programming and equipment to consumers. The equipment
is available at retail stores. The result, over a relatively short time
frame, has been lower equipment prices, enhanced options and
features. Requiring DBS providers to [comply with the 629 rules]
38. We note that the number of brands offered is constantly in flux, and this specific
finding may change over time. Nevertheless, it is clearly demonstrated that the ability to
purchase mobile telephone equipment from a variety of manufacturers is possible today, without
Carterfone regulation.
39. 47 U.S.C. § 549(e) (2000) ("The regulations adopted under this section shall cease to
apply when the Commission determines that-(l) the market for the multichannel video
programming distributors is fully competitive; (2) the market for converter boxes, and
interactive communications equipment, used ill conjunction with that service is fully
competitive; and (3) elimination of the regulations would promote competition and the public
interest.").
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would serve a limited purpose and disrupt technical and investment
structures that arose in a competitive environment.
40
Applying this same rational to the wireless industry would lead to a
conclusion that interoperability requirements are not necessary. The
wireless communications industry in the United States contains far
more than the three providers and ten equipment manufacturers noted
by the Commission in the DBS waiver. Indeed, mobile handsets are
available in many of the same retail stores that DBS boxes are sold,
like Best Buy, in addition to myriad other distribution outlets.
4 1
Moreover, the FCC's decision to exempt DirectTV and Echostar from
Section 629 requirements also indicates that the FCC explicitly was
not interested in a policy that would give consumers the right to use
the same navigation device across different multichannel video
programming distributors. In sum, based on the rationale for
excluding DBS providers from the set-top rules, the FCC would have
a difficult time applying the requested regulatory mandates on the
wireless industry based on its decisions regarding their cable set-top
box rules.
Further, consumers can switch between mobile carriers.
Subscriber chum-the number of wireless customers that a carrier
42loses in a time period-is considerable in the wireless industry. Even
carriers' attempts to limit chum, such as long-term contracts, can be
circumvented by consumers. For example, many retailers like
Buy.com sell unlocked wireless handsets,43  and the website
CelltradeUSA.com actually gives a customer seeking to leave one
service provider for another the ability to exchange his or her long-
40. Navigation Devices Order, supra note 4, at 14800-01 (emphasis added).
41. Indeed, on the Best Buy website, eleven different brands of mobile handsets are
available for sale, as opposed to twelve different brands of traditional, land-line telephones
subject to Part 68 rules (in the case of traditional land line telephones, excluding duplicates and
VoIP solutions such as those from Vonage). Best Buy, http://www.Best Buy.com (last visited
Mar. 4, 2009).
42. The FCC reports that most wireless providers have a chum of between 1.5% and
3.0% per month. CMRS Competition Report, supra note 16, at 2249. For example, according to
Sprint's 10-K filing in 2006, Sprint reported a 2004 monthly chum rate of 2.6%. Sprint Nextel
Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 47 (Mar. 1, 2007), available at http://library.corporate-
ir.net/library/12/127/127149/items/238651/200610K.pdf. Another wireless carrier, Alltel,
reported a 2006 monthly chum rate of 1.57%. Alltel Corp., Annual Report (Form 10-K), at 6
(Feb. 20, 2007). A carrier with these monthly chum rates will lose 20-30% of its customers each
year, or nearly a complete turnover every three to five years.
43. Buy.com, Unlocked GSM Cell Phones, http://www.buy.com/dept/unlocked-gsm-cell-
phones-bluetooth-cell-phone-accessories-cell-phones-with-service/12435.html (last visited Mar.
5, 2009).
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term contract with customers seeking to do the opposite.44 Given
these opportunities, consumers today have some ability to protect
themselves from efforts by wireless companies to extract consumer
surplus-certainly much more so than telephone customers of the Bell
System in the 1960s.
In sum, the wireless industry is not a monopoly, wireless carriers
are not vertically integrated into equipment, and the prices of wireless
carriers and equipment manufacturers are not regulated. As a result,
there is very little reason to expect that wireless firms today have the
same incentive to sabotage or engage in harmful vertical leveraging
into the mobile handset and equipment market as the monopoly Bell
System or cable providers had when Carterfone-type regulation was
imposed upon them.
III. ECONOMIC CONCERNS ABOUT WIRELESS CARTERFONE
INTERVENTION
Even though the oft-cited historical analogies for wireless
Carterfone proposals do not support this intervention, calls for
wireless Carterfone rules continue unabated in the United States.
Indeed, those calls have found some receptive ears at the FCC, as the
FCC has begun to base some of its decisions upon the perceived need
that wireless networks should be more "open" to additional
equipment and devices.
For example, in 2008 the FCC auctioned 25 MHz of spectrum
with the condition that the licensee conform to particular "open
platform" regulation, which are designed to "allow customers, device
manufacturers, third-party applications developers, and others to use
or develop the devices and applications of their choosing in C block
networks., 45 Verizon Wireless won the vast majority of these open
platform licenses, paying $4.7 billion for these "open platform"
licenses that cover the contiguous United States and Hawaii.46 FCC
Chairman Kevin J. Martin described the decision to encumber this
block of spectrum with open platform regulation as "a rare chance to
promote innovation and consumer choice while writing on a clean
44. CelltradeUSA.com, FAQ, http://www.celltradeusa.com/faq (last visited Mar. 5,
2009).
45. Service Rules for the 698-746, 747-762 and 777-792 MHz Bands, Second Report &
Order, 22 F.C.C.R. 15289, 15365 (2007).
46. See Auction of 700 MHz Band Licenses Closes, Public Notice, 23 F.C.C.R. 4572,
4645 (2008).
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slate."4 7 There are other proposals to impose identical open platform
regulation upon another substantial block of spectrum (called the third
Advanced Wireless Services Block, or AWS-III) that will be
auctioned as soon as 2009.4
As a consequence of these proposals and decisions, there is no
mistaking that we may be in the midst of a fundamental restructuring
of the regulatory basis of the nation's wireless industry. The
longstanding policy regime in which carriers were granted flexibility
in designing their networks to accommodate diverse and. different
technologies and services is being transformed into one that would
treat wireless network services more like a commodity.
Are these positive developments? Will consumers be better off
from this flurry of "open platform" regulation of the wireless
industry? To answer these questions, one must properly understand
the costs and benefits of this apparently significant shift in policy. In
this Section, we outline two potential harms that open platform
policies may engender. First, such intervention poses the risk of
commoditizing wireless network services, a development that may
harm the prospects for entry and competition in the industry. The
stagnation and perhaps even reduction of competition between
consumers would be a real threat to consumers. Indeed, one could
argue that consumers are already paying this cost. Verizon Wireless,
the nation's largest wireless provider, was the highest bidder for the
"open platform" license auctioned off by the FCC in 2008-because
the commodity nature of those open platform rules shrank the market
and virtually preordained that a new service provider would not be
able to use that license to enter the market profitably.
Second, we show below that prices for handsets are likely to rise
as a result of wireless Carterfone requirements, and there is no
guarantee that wireless service prices would fall. In that event,
consumers would be plainly worse off with this regulation.
A. Commoditization and Wireless Carterfone Regulation
We have written elsewhere that commoditization of broadband
networks would lead to increased industry concentration, produce
47. Kevin J. Martin, Chairman, FCC, Remarks at CTIA Wireless 2008 (April 1, 2008),
available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs_public/attachmatch/DOC-281259A I .pdf.
48. See, e.g., Service Rules for Advanced Wireless Services in the 2155-2175 MHz
Band, 23 F.C.C.R. 9859 (2008).
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higher prices, and potentially less innovation.49 Moreover, the current
diversity of wireless services in the United States today reduces the
possibility of oligopolistic coordination.50 Yet the leading wireless
Carterfone proponent states plainly and approvingly that
commoditization of wireless network services would be the ultimate
result of applying Carterfone-like regulation to the industry. 5' Due to
the presence of large fixed and sunk costs, the commoditization of
wireless network services would likely increase industry
consolidation, just as it would for wireline communications
networks.52
We can begin to see the risk of potential industry consolidation
by comparing the current United States wireless industry with those
of other nations, especially those that have adopted technical
49. See generally T. Randolph Beard, George S. Ford, Thomas M. Koutsky & Lawrence
J. Spiwak, Network Neutrality and Industry Structure, 29 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 149
(2007).
50. Implementation of Sections 3(n) and 332 of the Communications Act; Regulatory
Treatment of Mobile Services, Second Report & Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, 1471 (1994)
("Complex pricing structures, such as are used in the cellular industry, make it difficult for a
carrier to sustain collusive pricing."). Indeed, economic theory suggests that product
differentiation often impedes oligopolistic coordination. As observed by Kaserman and Mayo:
[W]here firms in the market produce a product whose differences are either
nonexistent or so minor that the only dimension of competition between firms is
price ... , it is relatively easy for firms to agree to establish an anticompetitive
price. Where firms compete in many dimensions (for example, price, quality, and
new service or product innovations), however, it becomes more difficult to
successfully collude because firms will need to establish limits on competition in
each of the relevant dimensions.
DAVID L. KASERMAN & JOHN W. MAYO, GOVERNMENT AND BUSINESS: THE ECONOMICS OF
ANTITRUST AND REGULATION 159 (1995); see also PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT
HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR
APPLICATION I 404c3 (3d ed. 2006) (stating that product complexity, differentiation, or variety
"multipl[ies] avenues of rivalry and hence the decisions that must be coordinated. Even if firms
reach a coordinated price, they may continue to compete by improving product quality."); F. M.
SCHERER & DAVIS ROSS, INDUSTRIAL MARKET STRUCTURE AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE
279 (3d ed. 1990) ("When products are heterogeneously differentiated, the terms of rivalry
become multidimensional, and the coordination problem grows in complexity by leaps and
bounds."). But cf STEPHEN MARTIN, ADVANCED INDUSTRIAL ECONOMICS 116-17 (1993)
("Product differentiation reduces the incremental profit to be gained by departing from a joint-
profit-maximizing configuration because product differentiation insulates rivals' markets and
reduces the extent to which a single firm can lure rivals' customers into its own market.").
51. Wu, supra note 1, at 416 ("Spectrum bandwidth is a commodity, and the interface
would provide the user with a fixed maximum bandwidth and, like an electric meter, bill the
consumer for the amount of bandwidth actually used").
52. See Beard et al., supra note 49, at 150 ("[G]iven the economic characteristics of local
communications networks, policies that promote commoditization of broadband access could
lead to the monopoly provision of advanced broadband services in many markets. This outcome
would harm consumers substantially.").
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specifications for 2G or 3G wireless network deployment. For
example, providers of mobile 2G services in Europe must comply
with the GSM Standard and 3G broadband service providers in
Europe must comply with the Universal Mobile Telecommunications
System (UMTS).53 Moreover, in Europe, it is not possible to operate
3G broadband services on 2G spectrum bands, so 3G service
providers have been required to construct new networks entirely.54
In contrast, carriers in the United States have deployed analog
and digital networks using an array of technologies based on the
carrier's plans for the devices it wants to support, services it wants to
provide, and the markets it services.5 5 The "air interface" technologies
have included, among others, GSM, iDEN, EDGE, UMTS, CDMA,
EVDO, EVDO-RevA, and TDMA 6 The Commission specifically
leaves the decision about what technology to deploy to the carriers,
with the view that carriers looking to maximize a return on their
investment in spectrum and infrastructure are best suited to decide the
fastest way to do so. This policy facilitates competition between
network providers and encourages the most rapid deployment of new
technology in part because new technologies can be deployed
incrementally. According to Cowhey and Aronson, due to this policy,
"fragmentation in standards resulted, but so did innovation, especially
in CDMA deployment." 57 Moreover, according to Cowhey and
Aronson, this flexible use policy "made the transition to 3G easier in
the United States because incumbents could simply upgrade their
existing networks rather than switch to new spectrum as was required
by the European Union.1
58
It appears that as a consequence of a spectrum policy regime
different than those adopted in Europe, the United States has a much
broader diversity of wireless network platforms and more competition
among network providers than markets where governments have
taken much stronger command-and-control approaches to technical
53. GSM Europe, Facts & Figures, http://www.gsmeurope.org/news/facts.shtml (last
visited Mar. 5, 2009) ("Market penetration across GSM and 3GSM [UMTS] networks in Europe
is 85%, with 15 countries having penetration figures of over 100%, and only 8 with less than
60%.").
54. Peter F. Cowhey & Jonathan D. Aronson, Wireless Standards and Applications:
Industrial Strategies and Government Policy, ANNENBERG RES. NETWORK ON INT'L COMMC'N
27 (2004), http://arnic.info/workshop04/CowheyAronson.pdf.
55. Id. at 40.
56. Unstrung, Mobile Wireless Air Interface Technologies,
http://www.unstrung.com/document.asp?doc_id= 16857 (last visited Mar. 9, 2008).
57. Cowhey & Aronson, supra note 54, at 27
58. Id.
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matters. Table 2 demonstrates that even after recent mergers, the
United States, in contrast to other Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) countries (the exception being
Denmark), has a substantial diversity among competing wireless
service providers. This implies that the commoditization of wireless
spectrum, as is more likely in countries with a mandated common
technical standard, can significantly impact industry structure and
concentration. Indeed, over a quarter of wireless subscribers in the
United States receive service from a firm other than one of the top
three providers nationwide.
Furthermore, the United States wireless market has, in most
cases, more competitors than most other industrialized countries,
higher usage rates of wireless networks, and significantly lower
prices. 59 This superior market performance indicates that the current
government policy of promoting network-to-network competition
between wireless service providers on all possible levels, including
technology and standards, is benefiting United States consumers.
Restructuring the industry through the regulation that proponents of
wireless net neutrality are urging would sacrifice network-to-network
competition for the sake of promoting network "openness" and would
likely impact the quantity, quality, and prices of wireless network
services.
In addition, applying Carterfone to the diverse wireless industry
in the United States would result in dizzying complexity. Unlike
Europe and other nations, the United States has deliberately not
established standard wireless network technologies and has allowed
license holders to deploy any technology of their choosing, so long as
it meets the conditions of the license. As a result, in the United States,
providers have deployed 2G and 3G networks using myriad
competing and evolving technologies. There is no evidence that it
would be possible to have a single, technical standard interface that
would permit a handset to operate on all of the AMPS, D-AMPS,
CDPD, GSM, iDEN, WIDEN, CDMA, GPRS, EDGE, W-CDMA,
and EVDO (not to mention other 3G and 4G technologies that are in
development) networks that are deployed today.60 Moreover, these
59. Implementation of Section 6002(b) of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of
1993, 21 F.C.C.R. 10947, 11044(2006).
60. In advancing his proposal, Wu (incorrectly) notes that much of "[t]he wireless world
already has standardized interfaces," citing the GSM standard requirement of SIM cards that has
been implemented in Europe. Wu, supra note 1, at 416. But the mere presence of standards does
not mean that navigating them is easy: Cowhey and Aronson describe a "standard's maze" of no
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technologies have been developed by companies and standards bodies
that are rife with different decision-making procedures that are
intermeshed with corporate and even mercantilist interests.
6 1
The challenge of creating the standard technical interface for
wireless equipment desired by wireless Carterfone proponents would
be daunting. The Commission's Part 68 rules, which are the end result
of Carterfone regulation of the wireline public switched telephone
network, take up 164 pages in the Code of Federal Regulations and
contain 77 separate diagrams. And those regulations apply to the
design of the familiar, plug interface for a telephone to a monopoly
telephone network that was generally built to national Bell System
standards nationwide. 62 The level of complexity involved in having
the regulator micromanage the technical interface between hundreds
of kinds of mobile devices and multiple wireless networks across the
United States is hard to imagine.
B. Higher Prices for End-Users
Applying Carterfone rules to a competitive industry has risks.
Such risks are demonstrated by evaluating the effects on equilibrium
prices of a prohibition on bundling the sale of wireless handsets with
services. Today, the bundling of equipment and service is an
essential, if not dominant, mode of competitive rivalry in wireless
services. In contrast, the local telephone network at the time of
Carterfone was not subject to competition, so addressing the linkages
between equipment and service was a different and easier problem.
This section demonstrates that forcing a de-bundling of wireless
handsets from wireless services would likely increase prices and harm
consumers. The current practice of wireless providers offering
discounts or subsidies for handsets in exchange for service
commitments would likely evaporate in a wireless Carterfone regime.
As a result, the price consumers would have to pay for handsets likely
fewer than 37 standards "that must be traversed to achieve" the future generation of wireless
networks. See Cowhey & Aronson, supra note 54, at 4, 6.
61. The European Telecommunications Standards Institute, ETSI, maintains GSM and
other European standards, and it makes decisions based on the European revenues of the
member companies. In the United States, the IEEE operates by requiring 75% support for a
standard, following the principle of one company, one vote. The Korean government selected
CDMA as its 2G standard with the intent of subsidizing the construction of handsets so as to
create an export market. According to Cowhey and Aronson, in Korea, Samsung Electronics and
SK Telecom are essentially in charge of standard-setting for 4G services. See Cowhey &
Aronson, supra note 54, at 27, 33, 37, 52, 56.
62. See Revision of Part 68 of the Comm'ns Rules to Specify Standard Plugs and Jacks
for the Connection of Tel. Equip. to the Nationwide Tel. Network, 62 F.C.C.2d 735-36 (1976).
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would increase, and there is no guarantee that wireless service prices
would decline commensurately.
To see the potential risks of applying Carterfone in a competitive
setting, we model the decisions and competitive interactions of firms,
in an imperfectly competitive market (duopoly), that sell two
complementary goods: equipment and the equipment service.63 The
discussion of duopolistic competition will be limited to the
assumption that the wireless industry is not perfectly competitive; a
view held by Carterfone proponents. 64 For Firm A, the demands for
equipment E and service S are respectively:
A A B
qE = AP -PE) (1)
Aq a -y(p _ Ps) + OqA (2)
A A
Here, qA and qA represent Firm A's sale of the equipment
(Good E) and service (Good S), respectively. Further, PE and Ps
represent the prices of Goods E and S, respectively. Finally, a is a
service demand parameter (ax > 0).
Equation (2) reveals a consistency about complimentary goods;
the more phones the provider induces customers to take (Good E), the
greater the demand for message services (Good S). This is consistent
with the advertising practices of wireless carriers, which primarily
relate to the latest available equipment rather than services. As for
differentiation of the services, the closer substitute goods of the two
firms are (the larger is y), the more the relative prices between the
firms matter. If the firms compete to any degree, then y > 0, otherwise
they are not substitutes. Handsets and services are complements, so
our model incorporates that fact and also allows for the strength of
this complementarity to vary by parameter 0 (where 0 > 0). The goods
are independent if 0 = 0. Given symmetry, a similar set of demands
exist for firm B. The model is thus a symmetric, differentiated goods
framework with price competition that incorporates, in the simplest
possible way, goods complementarity. To simplify, we assume that
63. For a more detailed presentation of this model, see generally George S. Ford, Thomas
M. Koutsky & Lawrence J. Spiwak, Consumers and Wireless Carterfone: An Economic
Perspective, 21 PHOENIX CENTER POL'Y BULL 1 (2008), available at http://www.phoenix-
center.org/PolicyBulletin/PCPB2lFinal.pdf.
64. Wu, supra note 1, at 422; Rob Frieden, Wireless Carterfone: A Long Overdue Policy
Promoting Consumer Choice and Competition 3 (New Am. Found., Working Paper No. 20,
2008), available at http://www.newamerica.net/files/WirelessCarterfone Frieden.pdf.
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total market demand is fixed (inelastic) and that the time period over
which the equipment good is consumed is taken to be equal to the
period of the service contract.6 s
Given the assumptions of profit maximization, costs normalized
to zero, and identical firms, we obtain the solutions for equilibrium
prices:
A l-O(a+O) A (a+O)(
PE ; Ps (3)
Y r
B 1-O(a+0) B (a+0). (4)
PE ; Ps7 Y
Since we assume all prices are net of marginal cost, a price for
Good E (equipment) below zero is taken to represent a subsidy to that
good.
Inspection and simple evaluation of the first parts of (3) and (4)
show that pE =pE < 0 is possible. All that is required for the
subsidized price of Good E is for 0(ct + 0) > 1, and since 0 > 0 and (X
> 0, this outcome is easily obtained. The result is intuitive; Good E is
a complement to Good S, and increases in sales of Good E increase
demand (and profit) from Good S. Below-cost pricing occurs in
equilibrium when complementarity is sufficiently great. Good S, in
contrast, is never sold at a below cost price (since ax, 0, y> 0). This
result is key. It is the complementarity which is influenced by the firm
and creates the incentive for subsidized handsets.
In the presence of a wireless Carterfone regulation, consumers
purchase equipment separate from service. As a conservative
assumption, the competition in equipment sales forces firms to sell
handsets at marginal cost. If equipment is subsidized in the
unregulated equilibrium (as it is today) then equipment prices rise (to
PE = =0); the first consequence of wireless Carterfone
regulation.66 Prices rise for two reasons. First, independent handset
sellers have no incentive to subsidize handset prices, since they do not
reap the benefits of the increased demand for services caused by low
equipment prices. Second, the stated purpose of wireless Carterfone
is to limit the ability of a wireless service provider to influence the
65. Joseph Farrell & Michael L. Katz, Innovation, Rent Extraction, and Integration in
Systems Markets, 48 J. INDUS. EcON. 413,417 (2000).
66. Recall that prices are net of marginal cost, so a price below zero is a subsidized price.
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handset market in ways that increase the demand for its services. As
complementarity weakens, the incentive to cut handset prices falls.
So, even if signing bonuses are offered by service providers, then the
size of such compensation is less than that without wireless
Carterfone regulation. The FCC has observed in the past that absent
equipment and service bundling, "consumers might have to pay
higher prices for handsets upfront." 67 Our analysis confirms the
sentiment. Under wireless Carterfone, consumers pay more and this
effect obviously reduces consumer welfare.
The effect on service prices is also of interest. To see what
happens to service prices, we impose the restriction on the model that
A BPE PE 0 (equipment prices equal marginal cost). In this case,
qE =qE= 1  and the prices of the service in the symmetric
equilibrium are:
A B at+90
PS = PS = (5)r )
Comparing Expression (5) to Expressions (3) and (4), we see
that prices for Good S are unchanged. So, while equipment prices rise,
service prices are unchanged. The inelasticity of handset demand is
partially responsible for this result. However, if equipment purchases
do respond to higher prices, then consumer welfare will fall in the
service market as well, despite the fact service prices fall. So, our
conclusions are not meaningfully impacted by this assumption.
In this model, the outcome of wireless Carterfone regulation is
decidedly anti-consumer: consumers pay higher, unsubsidized prices
for equipment but obtain no offsetting savings elsewhere. However,
this outcome is beneficial to the firms since they forego their losses in
providing subsidized equipment, while profits in service contracts are
unaffected. In effect, the wireless Carterfone policy has affected a
transfer from consumers to sellers.
By looking at prices, a number of important conclusions can be
drawn with high policy relevance. First, despite claims to the
contrary, notably Wu68 and Frieden,69 handset subsidies are consistent
with competitive rivalry.70 The coupling of handsets and services is a
67. CMRS Competition Report, supra note 16, at 2320.
68. See Wu, supra note 1.
69. See Frieden, supra note 64.
70. Recently, J.D. Power estimated that 36% of wireless customers receive a free phone
from their carrier, and many more consumers receive highly subsidized handsets. Press Release,
J.D. Power and Associates, Wireless Customers Are Keeping their Mobile Phones Longer as
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mode of competitive rivalry, benefitting consumers and reducing the
profits of firms. 7' Second, the steep discounts and subsidies on
wireless handsets require a strong complementarity between the
equipment and the services. The so-called restrictive practices of
phone locking, termination fees, and even functionality "crippling" all
have the effect of increasing the degree of complementarity between
the device and the services. This increased complementarity drives
the price cut for equipment, thereby creating consumer benefits. In
this light, actions deemed anticompetitive by some are, in fact, a
feature of competitive rivalry and benefit consumers substantially.
Since wireless Carterfone regulations explicitly and by design
lower the complementarity between handset and service sales,
wireless Carterfone regulations lower the incentive for wireless
providers to offer handset subsidies. As a result, should policymakers
impose wireless Carterfone obligations, consumers would pay more
for mobile handsets. These higher prices need not be offset by lower
service prices. Consequently, wireless Carterfone regulation can force
consumers to pay more for the same bundled service they receive
today. This would be a decidedly anti-consumer outcome.
IV. CONCLUSION
The practices of wireless network operators with regard to the
sale and certification of mobile handsets and equipment are drawing
increasing scrutiny from Congress, the FCC, and the public. Concerns
over the practice of bundling the sale of equipment with service, long-
term contracts, and the limited availability of certain handset models
to certain networks (such as the iPhone on AT&T Wireless and the
Blackberry Storm on Verizon Wireless) have resulted in calls for
regulatory intervention similar to what the FCC did to the wireline
telephone industry in the Carterfone line of decisions. The FCC has
Term Contracts Impact the Replacement Cycle (May 30, 2007), available at
http://www.jdpower.com/corporate/news/releases/pdf/2007079.pdf.
71. There are numerous anecdotes to this concept. Amol Sharma, AT&T's Bet on the
iPhone, WALL ST. J., June 10, 2008, at B I (quoting Ralph de la Vega, CEO AT&T Wireless: "It
seems like $199 is the right kind of price point to get significant mass-market adoption. It's
going to impact earnings in 2008 and 2009 in a negative way, but will turn very profitable in the
long term."); Roger Cheng, AT&T Takes Shot at Verizon Wireless with Subsidized iPhone, Dow
JONES NEWSWIRES, June 9, 2008 ("[T]he iPhone's significant price highlights the escalating
battle between it and Verizon Wireless, the nation's two largest carriers, especially for a
demographic of users that tend to spend more per month on data services. 'The pricing is
extremely aggressive and will definitely result in far more consumers getting their hands on the
device,' said Ross Rubin, an analyst at consumer research firm NPD Group. 'They understand
that to build market share in this new wireless world, they have to be a lot more aggressive."').
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responded and has begun to encumber spectrum with Carterfone-like
"open platform" requirements. It begs the question, however, whether
the regulatory intervention is a good idea. As shown, the Carterfone
analogy to today's wireless industry handset practices simply does not
hold water.
The wireless communications industry in the United States is not
the vertically-integrated, fully-regulated Bell System of old. The
Carterfone decision and subsequent Commission regulation was
concerned about quarantining a regulated, vertically-integrated
monopoly service provider from leveraging its market power into an
adjacent equipment market. The need for intervention in those cases
was important and unquestionably motivated by market power and
the presence of (and the firm's concurrent efforts to evade) price
regulation.
As a result, there are reasons to be concerned that Carterfone
regulation in today's wireless industry would be harmful to
consumers. One such reason is the commoditization of wireless
network services. In essence, the end goal of this type of intervention
would be to turn wireless service into something like gasoline;
consumers would purchase those services when they need it with the
handset of their choice, without any long-term commitments of any
sort. While that prospect may be appealing on some level,
commoditization does present a significant threat to consumers. There
is the stark possibility that by shrinking the size of the wireless
market, the prospects for new entry and competition would be
dramatically decreased. Consumers have multiple choices of wireless
providers in the United States today because we permit service and
product differentiation. Shrinking the market would likely shrink the
number of providers, and thereby harm consumers.
In addition, Carterfone rules would increase the prices that
consumers pay for mobile handsets without offsetting the decrease in
wireless service prices. This effect would be immediate if Carterfone
rules were imposed because the current practice of wireless firms
subsidizing the sale of mobile handsets would quickly end.
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Table 1. Retail Availability of Telephone Equipment
Brands at Best BUya
PSTN Mobile
Panasonic
Uniden
AT&T
VTech
Philips
Phonemate
Palm Motorola
LG
Samsung
Blackberry
Sony Ericsson
Nokia
Sanyo
Apple
HTC
Brands at WalMartb
PSTN Mobile
Panasonic Palm
Uniden Motorola
AT&T LG
VTech Samsung
Philips Blackberry
GE Sony Ericsson
RCA Nokia
American Telecom Sanyo
Emerson HTC
JWin Pantech
UTStarcom
'BestBuy.com, Telephones,
http://www.bestbuy.com/site/olspage.jsp?id=abcat08O2000&type=category (last visited Oct. 15,
2008).
b WalMart.com, Phones, http://www.walmart.com/search/search-ng.do?searchquery=phones
(last visited Oct. 15, 2008).
Table 2. Mobile Operator Market Share According to Number of Operators,
Percentage (2003)
Number of operators
Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Czech Republic
Denmark
Finland
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Iceland
Ireland
Italy
Japan
Korea
Luxembourg
1 2
46.6 30.6
43.9 28.7
49.9 35.8
36.9 28.3
43.4 40.7
35.1 23.8
51.4 28.7
48.8 35.3
40.6 38.1
37.8 35.5
47.4 35.8
66.8 32.9
55 40
46.1 36.4
53.9 19.6
54.4 31.1
62.7 37.3
5 Others
10.2 6.9
3.3 2.5
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Table 2. (continued)
Number of operators 1 2 3 4 5 Others
Mexico 77.8 11.5 6.6 4.1
Netherlands 39.1 25 15.6 10.9 9.4
New Zealand 52.3 47.7
Norwaya 58.3 29.9 6.2 3.6 2
Poland 35.7 32.8 31.5
Portugal 52.3 30.2 17.5
Slovakia 56.2 43.8
Spain 52.4 25.8 21.8
Sweden 43.6 38 15.1 3.3
Switzerland 61.4 20.4 17.6 0.6
Turkey 68.1 18.3 7.2 6.4
United Kingdom 24.5 23.9 25.6 25.6 0.4 2
United States (2003) 23.6 13.9 13.8 10.0 8.1 30.6
United States (20 06 )b 26.6 25.2 22.0 10.7 5.2 10.3
Sources: OECD, OECD COMMUNICATIONS OUTLOOK, tbl. 2.6 (2005); FCC, ELEVENTH
ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS ON THE STATE OF COMPETITION IN THE COMMERCIAL MOBILE
RADIO SERVICES (CMRS) INDUSTRY, app. A., tbls. 2, 4 (2006).
aThree operators in Norway are resellers.
b There are 150 cellular mobile operators in the United States.
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